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Abstract. Whenever agents deal with condential information, it is im-
portant that they comply with a principled security policy. We show how
the database concept of multi-level security can be applied to inter-agent
communication. This includes the case where an unauthorized agent is
misinformed on purpose in order to protect condential information.
1 Introduction
In certain applications, it is essential to protect condential information from
unauthorized access. While access restrictions in relational databases have to
be dened within the database schema, implying that only entire tables (i.e.
predicates) can be protected, the concept of multi-level security (MLS)
1
allows
to protect single rows of a table (i.e. atomic sentences) according to their security
classication. The MLS concept is not concerned with lower-level security issues
such as authentication, or secure message transport protocols, but only with the
denition of secure query answering and secure update in information systems.
We show how multi-level security can be achieved in multi-agent and multi-
database systems. This requires that the security restrictions dened in MLS
tables have to be taken into consideration in inter-agent communication. We
formalize multi-level security on the basis of our theory of vivid knowledge and
agent systems introduced in [Wag95, Wag96].
A vivid agent is a software-controlled system whose state is represented by
a knowledge base, and whose behavior is represented by means of action and
reaction rules. The basic functionality of a vivid agent comprises a knowledge
system (including an update and an inference operation), and the capability to
represent and perform actions in order to be able to generate and execute plans.
Since a vivid agent is `situated' in an environment with which it has to be able to
communicate, it also needs the ability to react in response to perception events,
and in response to communication events created by the communication acts
of other agents. Reactions may be immediate and independent from the current
believe state of the agent but they may also depend on the result of deliberation.
In any case, they are triggered by events which are not controlled by the agent.
We do not assume a xed formal language and a xed logical system for the
knowledge base of an agent. Rather, we believe that it is more appropriate to
choose a suitable knowledge system for each agent individually according to its
1
See, e.g., [Lan81, JS91, SWQ94].
domain and its tasks. In simple cases, a relational database-like system (admit-
ting of atomic sentences only) will do the job, while in more involved cases one
may need the ability to process, in addition to simple facts, uncertain, tempo-
ral or condential information, or even such advanced capabilities as deductive
query answering and abductive reasoning.
While certain agents may have rather limited capabilities, others are quite
complex. We call the simplest form of a vivid agent a reagent. A reagent does
not have explicit goals and intentions but only beliefs about the current state of
aairs. It reacts to events in its environment, taking into account what it cur-
rently believes. A reagent updates its beliefs and draws inferences from them for
answering queries by applying the respective operations of the vivid knowledge
system it is based on.
A cooperative knowledge base can be viewed as a reagent, since coopera-
tive query answering can be achieved on the basis of reactive communication
protocols dened at design time (without planning for user-dened tasks com-
municated at run time). A multidatabase (MDB) system, involving inhomoge-
neous nodes with a global distribution schema, can therefore be conceptualized
as a multi-reagent system. Notice that if there were only relational databases
in a MDB, there would be no communication, since the semantics of RDBs
assumes their completeness, i.e. a standard RDB has never any reason to ask
another database for additional information. Communication between databases
requires incomplete knowledge.
2 Vivid Knowledge Systems
The knowledge system of a vivid agent is based on three specic languages: L
KB
is the set of all admissible knowledge bases, L
Query
is the query language, and
L
Input
is the set of all admissible inputs, i.e. those formulas representing new
information a KB may be updated with. While the input language denes what
the agent can be told (i.e. what it is able to assimilate into its KB), the query
language denes what the agent can be asked. Where L is a set of formulas, L
0
denotes its restriction to closed formulas (sentences). Elements of L
0
Query
, i.e.
closed query formulas, are also called if-queries.
Denition 1 (Knowledge System) An abstract knowledge system
2
K con-
sists of three languages and two operations: a knowledge representation language
L
KB
, a query language L
Query
, an input language L
Input
, an inference relation
`, such that X ` F holds if F 2 L
0
Query
can be inferred from X 2 L
KB
, and an
update operation Upd, such that the result of updating X 2 L
KB
with F 2 L
0
Input
is the knowledge base Upd(X;F ).
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Denition 2 (Answer Operation) The answer operation Ans is dened
for if-queries F by
Ans(X;F ) =
8
<
:
yes if X ` F
no if X ` :F
unknown otherwise
and for query formulas G with free variables x
1
; : : : ; x
n
by
hc
1
; : : : ; c
n
i 2 Ans(X;G(x
1
; : : : ; x
n
)) if X ` G(c
1
; : : : ; c
n
)
We now present two important examples of knowledge systems: relational databases,
and MLS databases.
2.1 Relational Databases
A relational database is a nite set of nite relations (tables) corresponding to
a nite set of atomic sentences. For instance, a hospital database may contain
facts expressing who is currently a patient and what are their diagnoses,
hosp
=
fPatient ; Diagnosisg, where
Patient =
BY
MJ
JB
Diagnosis =
BY alc
JB mal
The propositional representation of 
hosp
is
X
hosp
= fp(BY ); p(MJ ); p(JB); d(BY; alc); d(JB;mal)g
representing the information that Boris Yeltsin (BY), Michael Jackson (MJ),
and James Bond (JB) are currently patients of the hospital, and the diagnosis
of BY is alcoholism, and that of JB is malaria. As a kind of natural deduction
from positive facts an inference relation ` between a relational database X and
an if-query is dened in the following way:
(a) X ` a if a 2 X
(:a) X ` :a if a 62 X
Notice the non-monotonicity of (:a): negation in relational databases corre-
sponds to negation-as-failure. Compound if-queries, involving conjunction and
disjunction, are handled in the standard way. Negated compound if-queries are
treated by simplication according to the DeMorgan rules and double negation
elimination. We obtain, for example, X
hosp
` p(MJ ) ^ :d(MJ ; alc). Because
of its built-in general Closed-World Assumption, a relational database X an-
swers an if-query F by either yes or no: the answer is yes if X ` F , and no
otherwise. For instance, Ans(X
hosp
; d(BY;mal)) = no. Updates are insertions,
Upd(X; a) := X [ fag, and deletions, Upd(X;:a) := X   fag, where a is an
atom. For a consistent set of literals E, we have Upd(X;E) = X [ E
+
  E
 
,
where E
+
contains the positive, and E
 
contains the negative literals of E. For
instance,
Upd(X
hosp
;:d(JB;mal) ^ d(JB; yf))
= fp(BY ); p(MJ ); p(JB); d(BY; alc); d(JB; yf)g
describes a possible transaction. The knowledge system of relational databases
is denoted by A (for Atomic). We also describe a knowledge system by means
of its language table:
A =
L
KB
2
At
L
Query
L(:;^;_; 9;8)
L
0
Ans
fyes; nog
L
Input
Lit
Knowledge systems extending A conservatively are called vivid. Positive vivid
knowledge systems use a general Closed-World Assumption, whereas general
vivid knowledge systems employ specic Closed-World Assumptions (and possi-
bly two kinds of negation). For instance, A can be extended to the general vivid
knowledge system of factbases, by allowing for literals instead of atoms as infor-
mation units. Further important examples of positive vivid knowledge systems
are temporal, uncertain and MLS databases. All these kinds of knowledge bases
can be extended to deductive knowledge bases by adding deduction rules of the
form F  G [Wag95].
2.2 MLS Databases
In multi-level secure (MLS) databases,
3
all information items are assigned a
security classication, and all database users are assigned a security clearance,
both from a partially ordered set of security levels. For instance, the four security
levels unclassied (0), condential (1), secret (2), and top secret (3) may be used
to classify entries in a MLS table.
As an example, consider the database of a hospital. Depending on the re-
spective person it may be sensitive information to know whether someone is a
patient in the hospital. In the case of a politician, such infomation would be
publicly available. But not so in the case of a shy pop star, or a secret service
agent. The following MLS tables containing the records of patients and their
diagnoses form the hospital database X
hosp
:
Patient =
BY 0
MJ 1
JB 3
Diagnosis =
BY alc 1
JB mal 3
These tables represent the following beliefs at the respective clearance level:
level beliefs
0 fp(BY )g
1; 2 fp(BY ); p(MJ ); d(BY; alc)g
3 fp(BY ); p(MJ ); p(JB); d(BY; alc); d(JB;mal)g
3
See, e.g., [Lan81, JS91, SWQ94].
The basic principle underlying MLS query answering is called simple security
property and was dened in the Bell-LaPadula model of mandatory security, see
[Lan81]. It can also be described by the slogan \no read up", i.e. users are only
permitted to read from a level dominated by their own. We will formalize this
principle below in the denition of secure inference. As opposed to [SWQ94], we
think that it should be dened by the logical semantics of MLS databases how
lower-level beliefs carry over to higher-level beliefs.
Notice that it is not possible to preserve privacy and maintain security by
simply omitting information, like in the reply `no answer' to the question `Is
Michael Jackson a patient in this hospital ?'. The asking reporter could easily
infer from this refusal to answer that MJ must be a patient in the hospital. The
only way to maintain security is to give a wrong answer, i.e. to misinform the
unauthorized asker. The rationality principle of secure inference is the
(Principle of Minimal Misinformation) Askers are only misinformed about
an information item if they are not suciently authorized with respect to that
item.
Assume, for instance, that Boris Yeltsin is in the hospital with an accute alco-
holism. When a reporter asks if BY is in the hospital, he receives the answer yes.
If he then asks whether BY has drunk too much, the secure answer may be no
or unknown.
4
When being asked what BY suers from, the hospital information
system may reply to the reporter that he has a severe inuenca (i.e. a cover
story).
MLS queries are annotated by the clearance level of the asker. Since reporters
have clerance level 0 (unclassied), we get
Ans(X
hosp
; p(MJ )=0) = no
while a doctor of the hospital with clerance level 2 would get the right answer:
`yes, MJ is a patient in this hospital',
Ans(X
hosp
; p(MJ )=2) = yes
Denition 3 (Security Hierarchy) A security hierarchy SH is a nite
partial order with a greatest element denoted by >.
In our examples, we will only use the security hierarchy f0; 1; 2; 3g introduced
above.
Denition 4 (MLS Table) A MLS table R over a security hierarchy SH
and a relation schema r(x
1
; : : : ; x
n
) is a nite subset of D
1
 : : :D
n
 SH.
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Notice that this choice in misinforming is only available in the case of incomplete
predicates allowing for the answer unknown.
Denition 5 (MLS Database) A MLS database  over a schema  =
hfr
1
; : : : ; r
m
g; SHi is a nite set of MLS tables fR
1
; : : : ; R
m
g over the security
hierarchy SH. Its propositional representation is
X

=
m
[
i=1
fr
i
(c)= : hc; i 2 R
i
g
It can be decomposed into a set of relational databases f

j 2 SHg, such that


= fR

1
; : : : ; R

m
g
R

i
= fc j hc; i 2 R
i
&   g
We write X

, instead of X

 , for the propositionl representation of 

.
It may be useful to be able to ask questions relative to others' viewpoints. For
example, the nurse (with clearance level 1) might need to ask, `If a reporter (with
clearance level 0) asks for a list of the current patients, what will be the answer
?' She would put this as the query:
Ans(X
hosp
; (B
0
p(x))=1) = fBY g
There is no need to allow for nested B operators.
Denition 6 (Secure Inference) Let X be a MLS database, ;  2 SH,
l 2 Lit, F;G 2 L(:;^;_; 9;8;B

), and H 2 L
0
(:;^;_; 9;8).
(l) X ` l= :() X

`
A
l
(^) X ` (F ^G)= :() X ` F= & X ` G=
(_) X ` (F _G)= :() X ` F= or X ` G=
(9) X ` (9xF (x))= :() Ans(X;F (x)=) 6= ;
(8) X ` (8xF (x))= :() Ans(X;:F (x)=) = ;
(B

) X ` (B

H)= :()    & X

`
A
H
where `
A
is inference in A.
In formalizing secure update, we do not follow the Bell-LaPadulamodel which
requires a \no write down" policy (also called `-property') where users are
only permitted to write to a level that dominates their own. This principle is
supposed to prevent users from passing information directly downward through
the security hierarchy. It makes only sense, however, in an intelligence context
where a highly authorized user may be spy. In a security policy for normal
organizations without particular intelligence concerns it seems more reasonable
to assume that users in the higher level of the hierarchy can be trusted not to
disclose sensitive information to lower levels. This also corresponds more closely
to management practice. We will therefore assume the principle of \no write
up" preventing users to overwrite information at levels above their own while
permitting them to update lower level information either seriously or for the
purpose of misinformation.
Inputs to MLS databases are annotated by the clearance level of the infor-
mation supplier.
Denition 7 (Secure Update) Let a be an atom, and l a literal.
Upd(X; (B

a)=) :=

X [ fa=g if    & X 6` a=
X otherwise
Upd(X; (B

:a)=) := X   fa= 2 X :     g
Upd(X; l=) := Upd(X; (B

l)=)
The knowledge system of MLS databases, denoted by SA, is then dened as
SA =
L
KB
2
AtSH
L
0
Query
L
0
(:;^;_; 9;8;B

) SH
L
0
Ans
fyes; nog
L
Input
Lit SH [ B

Lit SH
Notice that in MLS databases, it is not possible to protect negative information
by providing suitable misinformation. If, for instance, a hospital has to pretend
that James Bond is among its patients, i.e. if the negative information :p(JB)
has to be protected, say at clearance level 3 (top secret), this cannot be achieved
by means of simple MLS tables which would have to record negative entries in
addition to positve ones. This is possible, however, in MLS bitables which are
dened in [Wag97].
3 Specication and Execution of Reagents
Simple vivid agents whose mental state comprises only beliefs, and whose behav-
ior is purely reactive, i.e. not based on any form of planning and plan execution,
are called reagents. A reagent A = hX;EQ;RRi, on the basis of a knowledge
system K, consists of
1. a knowledge base X 2 L
KB
,
2. an event queue EQ being a list of instantiated event expressions, and
3. a set RR of reaction rules, consisting of epistemic and physical reaction and
interaction rules which code the reactive and communicative behavior of the
agent.
A multi-reagent system is a tuple of reagents: S = hA
1
; : : : ;A
n
i.
3.1 Operational Semantics of Reaction Rules
Reaction rules encode the behavior of vivid agents in response to perception
events created by the agent's perception subsystems, and to communication
events created by communication acts of other agents. We distinguish between
epistemic, physical and communicative reaction rules. We use L
PEvt
and L
CEvt
to
denote the perception and communication event languages, and L
Evt
= L
PEvt
[
L
CEvt
. The following table describes the dierent formats of epistemic, physical
and communicative reaction rules:
epistemic E recvMsg["; S]; Cond
physical do(); E  recvMsg["; S]; Cond
communicative sendMsg[;R]; E  recvMsg["; S]; Cond
The event condition recvMsg["(U); S] is a test whether the event queue of the
agent contains a message of the form "(U) sent by some perception subsystem
of the agent or by another agent identied by S, where " 2 L
Evt
represents a
perception or a communication event type, and U is a suitable list of parameters.
The epistemic condition Cond 2 L
Query
refers to the current knowledge state,
and the epistemic eect E 2 L
Input
species an update of the current knowledge
state.
In a physical reaction, do((V )) calls a procedure realizing the action 
with parameters V . In a communicative reaction, sendMsg[(V ); R] sends the
message  2 L
CEvt
with parameters V to the receiver R. Both perception and
communication events are represented by incoming messages. We identify a com-
munication act with the corresponding communication event which is perceived
by the addressee of the communication act.
Reaction rules are triggered by events. The agent interpreter continuously
checks the event queue of the agent. If there is a new event message, it is matched
with the event condition of all reaction rules, and the epistemic conditions of
those rules matching the event are evaluated. If they are satisable in the cur-
rent knowledge base, all free variables in the rules are instantiated accordingly
resulting in a set of triggered actions with associated epistemic eects. All these
actions are then executed, leading to physical actions and to sending messages to
other agents, and their epistemic eects are assimilated into the current knowl-
edge base.
3.2 Dening the Execution of Reagents
The perception-reaction-cycle in the execution of reagents consists of the follow-
ing steps:
repeat
1. Get the next message from the event queue, and check whether it
triggers any reaction rules. If it does not, then repeat 1, else continue.
2. For each of the triggered reaction rules, assimilate the epistemic eect
of the triggered action into the knowledge base, and if it is
1) a physical action, execute it by calling the associated procedure.
2) a communicative action, execute it by sending the corresponding
message to the specied addressee.
The following cycle procedure is a Prolog-style meta-logic specication of the
reagent execution model.
cycle( KB)
 newEvent( Evt),
ndall( ActE, (reaction(ActE,Evt,Cond), demo(KB,Cond)), ActEs),
perform( ActEs, KB, KB
0
),
cycle( KB
0
).
perform( [], KB, KB).
perform( [Act/E j ActEs], KB, KB
0
)
 execute( Act),
assimilate( E, KB, KB1),
perform( ActEs, KB1, KB
0
).
execute( noAct).
execute( do(Act))  call( Act).
execute( send(Msg,To))  pvm send( To, 1, Msg).
Here, reaction rules are represented as triples hAct=E ;Evt ;Cond i in the table
reaction. A null action noAct is used to represent epistemic actions as noAct/E.
An incoming event message Evt is popped from the message queue, and subse-
quently matched with suitable reaction rules. If the precondition Cond of a rule
matching Evt holds in the current knowledge state, expressed by demo( KB,
Cond), the epistemic eect E associated with the action Act is assimilated into
the knowledge base, the physical or communicative action Act is performed by
means of appropriate procedure calls,
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and cycle starts over with the updated
knowledge base KB
0
. The demo and assimilate meta-predicates are formally re-
lated to our knowledge system concepts of inference and update:
demo(KB;Cond) :() KB ` Cond
assimilate(E ;KB;KB
0
) :() KB
0
= Upd(KB;E )
4 Secure Inter-Agent Communication
Similar to the KQML model of communication
6
, we assume that the following
requirements are met by any vivid agent system:
{ Agents may interact asynchronously with more than one other agent at the
same time.
{ Agents are known to one another by their symbolic names, rather than their
IP addresses. There may be special agents, called facilitators, which provide
address information services in order to facilitate communication.
{ An agent communicates verbally with other agents: actively by sending, and
passively by receiving, typed messages.
7
5
The above realization of communication acts is based on the built-in pvm send of
PVM-Prolog.
6
See, e.g., [Lab96].
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In addition, there may be non-verbal forms of communication, e.g. by means of
perception.
{ Messages may be sent over network links, or via specic radio links, or,
similar to human communication, by means of audio signals. The transport
mechanism is not part of the communication model of vivid agents. Certain
assumptions about message passing, however, are necessary or useful:
 When an agent sends a message, it directs that message to a specic
addressee.
 When an agent receives a message, it knows the sender of that message.
 The order of messages in point-to-point communication is preserved.
 No message gets lost.
{ Message types are dened by a communication event language based on
speech act theory.
{ The arguments of a message (i.e. the `propositional content' of the corre-
sponding communication act) may aect the mental state of both the sender
and the receiver.
Communication in multiagent systems should be based on the speech act the-
ory of Austin and Searle [Aus62, Sea69], an informal theory within analytical
philosophy of language. The essential insight of speech act theory was that an
utterance by a speaker is, in general, not the mere statement of a true or false
sentence, but rather an action of a specic kind (such as an assertion, a request,
a promise, etc.). Therefore, logic alone is not sucient for a semantic account of
verbal communication.
In our model of agents, the semantics of communicative actions is rather
determined by
1. a mentalistic model of agents, dening their mental state, together with a
notion of mental conditions and mental eects of actions,
2. a satisfaction relation between mental states and mental conditions,
3. an operation that assimilates mental eects into a mental state,
4. the assignment of a mental precondition and a mental eect to each action,
and
5. associating with each type of communicative action a type of reaction (of
the addressee of a communication act).
In this paper, we use the simple model of reagents, where the mental state
consists only of beliefs (represented in a KB), the mental satisfaction relation
and the mental assimilate operation are ` and Upd, and communicative actions
are represented by means of reaction rules.
We use a functional predicate
agent( Agent, Clearance),
for recording the clearance levels of all agents known to an agent. Agents without
an entry in this table will be assigned clearance level 0 (unclassied) by default.
The following denition of secure communication is based on the assumption
that all agents involved in the communication are believed to be truthful and
competent by their fellow agents, implying that they normally provide correct
information.
The basic inter-agent communication functionality consists of three types of
communication events: tell, ask, and reply.
4.1 Tell
The piece of information conveyed by a tell act is assimilated into the beliefs of
the receiver (according to the above denition of secure update).
This is expressed by the following reaction rules:
r
1
: F=C  recvMsg[tell(F ); S]; agent(S;C)
r
2
: F=0 recvMsg[tell(F ); S]; :9C(agent(S;C))
where F is a formula representing an admissible input, i.e. it has either the form
of an atom, r(c), or a negated atom, :r(c), possibly prexed by a subscripted
belief operator B

, and C is the clearance level of the sender S (F , C, and S are
logical variables like in Prolog).
4.2 Ask
Since only agents with incomplete information will ask other agents, we may
assume that the knowledge system of an asking agent is F , the system of re-
lational factbases, or any conservative extension of it. Agents with knowledge
systems such as A, or SA, have complete information, i.e. for any if-query F ,
they believe either F or :F . Such agents will be asked for information by other
agents, and they will reply to them, but they will never ask themselves.
For practical reasons, each query is associated with an ID, called query han-
dle. This ID is used to store queries in the system table query until the answers
are received, or until they are timed out. Like in KQML, we distinguish between
1. askif: asking an if-query,
2. askone: asking for one (possibly non-deterministic) answer substitution, like
in Prolog, and
3. askall: asking for all answer substitutions (i.e. a table), like in SQL.
The reaction rules for handling an ask-if event use the meta-predicate ifans(
IfQuery, Answer) which holds in the current knowledge state X , whenever
Ans(X; IfQuery) = Answer .
r
3
: sendMsg[replyif(QID ; A); S]
 recvMsg[askif(QID ; F ); S]; agent(S;C) ^ ifans(F=C;A)
r
4
sendMsg[replyif(QID ; A); S]
 recvMsg[askif(QID ; F ); S]; :9C(agent(S;C)) ^ ifans(F=0; A)
where F is a formula representing a relational database if-query, and the answer
value A is either yes or no. The reactions to ask-all and ask-one events are dened
in a similar way:
r
5
: sendMsg[replyall(QID ; A); S]
 recvMsg[askall(QID ; F ); S]; agent(S;C) ^ allans(F=C;A)
r
6
: sendMsg[replyone(QID ; A); S]
 recvMsg[askone(QID ; F ); S]; agent(S;C) ^ oneans(F=C;A)
using the meta-predicates allans and oneans providing an answer set, resp. a
single answer substitution. We have omitted the rules for the case of a sender
without an entry in the agent table, since they are analogous to the corresponding
rule above.
4.3 Reply
Replies to an if-query are processed as follows:
r
7
: F  recvMsg[replyif(QID ; yes); S]; query(QID ; F )
r
8
: :F  recvMsg[replyif(QID ; no); S]; query(QID ; F )
4.4 An Example of Secure Communication
In our nal example, we assume three information agents:
1. A software agent d serving as the personal assistant to the doctor in charge
of treating MJ and BY. This agent works with a relational database which
does not have complete information about diagnoses. Its initial state is X
0
d
=
fd(BY; alc)g.
2. A software agent s serving as the personal assistant to a secretary working
in the hospital administration.
3. The hospital MLS database X
hosp
from above, which reacts to tell and ask
events by assimilating new inputs and replying to queries. Its agent name
is hdb (hospital database). It uses the security classications agent(s,1) and
agent(d,2).
Case 1: Assume that a reporter asks the secretary (by email) whether MJ
is currently a patient in the hospital. The personal assistant of the secretary,
although knowing that p(MJ ), asks hdb whether the reporter may know that
fact by sending the message askif(B
0
p(MJ )), ring at hdb the reaction rule r
3
with the following instantiation (we omit the query ID):
sendMsg[replyif(no); s]
 recvMsg[askif(B
0
p(MJ )); s]; agent(s; 1) ^ ifans((B
0
p(MJ ))=1; no)
since Ans(X
0
hosp
; (B
0
p(MJ ))=1) = no. After receiving this negative answer, s
forwards it to the reporter.
Case 2: Assume that the doctor is wondering if BY was diagnosed to have hep-
atitis by one of her colleagues, and thus sends the message askif (Q2; d(BY; hep)
to hdb, recording the query together with its IDQ2 as the fact query(Q2; d(BY; hep).
This triggers at hdb the rule
sendMsg[replyif(Q2; no); d]
 recvMsg[askif(Q2; d(BY; hep)); d]; agent(d; 2) ^ ifans(d(BY; hep))=2; no)
since Ans(X
0
hosp
; d(BY; hep)=2) = no. Agent d reacts to the reply by applying
the rule r
7
:
:d(BY; hep) recvMsg[replyif(Q2; no); hdb ]; query(Q2; d(BY; hep))
yielding the update
X
1
d
= Upd(X
0
d
;:d(BY; hep)) = fd(BY; alc)g
Notice that X
d
, as a relational database, is not capable of recording the nega-
tive information :d(BY; hep), although it would be useful for avoiding further
questions (communication overload) in the style of replication. This indicates
that we have to extend the concept of relational databases in the frmework of
multidatabase systems.
5 Conclusion
We have shown how the concept of multi-level security can be applied in vivid
agent systems. For this purpose, we have dened
1. the knowledge system of MLS databases including a formalization of the \no
read/write up" security model, and
2. basic inter-agent communication rules which take security classications into
consideration.
A more realistic treatment would have to account for MLS databases with in-
tegrity constraints (such as functional dependencies), where `cover stories' are
overridden by attribute values with a higher classication because of the inconsis-
tency created by the violation of functional dependencies. This can be achieved
by a straightforward extension of our present model.
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